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ASSESSING THE MERITS OF THE CTBT 
David Hafemeister 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the nonproliferation regime have 
been weakened; perhaps no other issue demonstrates this as dramatically as the status of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the ratification of which the U.S. Senate rejected 
in October 1999. Despite the U.S. rejection, the test ban has strong international support*the 
most recent vote to promote the CTBT in the UN General Assembly passed overwhelmingly, with 
175 votes to 1 (the United States) and three abstentions. The Obama administration favors U.S. 
ratification of the CTBT, but this is no guarantee that Washington will ratify the test ban. Members 
of Congress must weigh the benefits and risks of signing the treaty; however, these calculations 
can sometimes be difficult to carry out. This article examines whether a return to nuclear testing 
would in fact benefit the United States, or if a test ban would be a greater contribution to U.S. 
national security. 
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When considering whether to ratify an arms control treaty, U.S. senators should cast their 
votes based on the treaty’s net benefit. After evaluating all aspects of the agreement, they 
should consider whether the treaty, taken as a whole, will increase or decrease national 
security. In the case of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), this involves 
asking a series of questions, including: would a resumption of nuclear testing help or 
hinder efforts to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT)? If the United States resumed testing, would other countries follow suit, and would 
this diminish U.S. security? Is nuclear testing essential to maintaining the nuclear stockpile? 
And is the CTBT effectively verifiable via the International Monitoring System and National 
Technical Means? 
When the Senate first considered the CTBT in 1999, a majority of senators concluded 
that it would not enhance national security, and it was rejected. The Obama administration 
reportedly plans to resubmit the treaty for ratification next year, before the start of the 
2010 NPT Review Conference.1 Much has changed over the last decade, including views 
about nuclear weapons. Significant progress has also been made in deploying 
technologies to verify compliance with the CTBT [see ‘‘Verifiability, Reliability, and National 
Security: The Case for U.S. Ratification of the CTBT,’’ in this issue]. This viewpoint assesses 
the security-related aspects of the treaty from a U.S. perspective and seeks to counter the 
claims of treaty opponents that ratification of the CTBT would diminish rather than 
strengthen U.S. national security. 
Nuclear Testing and the Modernization of Nuclear Forces 
If nuclear testing ever resumes, China has the most to gain. China has tested only forty-five 
times, compared to 1,030 U.S. tests. China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force of 
some two dozen liquid-fueled missiles could attack the western United States with single-
warhead missiles. There is increasing speculation that China would like to miniaturize its 
nuclear weapons in order to carry multiple warheads on its ICBMs, but this would be 
possible only if China conducts additional tests. Thus, the CTBT will help prevent further 
technological advances in Chinese warheads. 
Russia is planning to retain as many as 1,500 deployed strategic warheads.2 Russia’s 
liquid-fueled ICBMs are scheduled to be withdrawn by about 2020. A return to testing 
would give the Russian military leaders political leverage to modernize and expand their 
aging nuclear forces. 
India and Pakistan are actively improving their nuclear forces, and additional nuclear 
tests would allow India (followed by Pakistan) to develop smaller, more sophisticated 
thermonuclear bombs. North Korea probably has about a half-dozen nuclear weapons 
(and has conducted two low-yield tests). Although it poses only a modest security threat 
at present, both because North Korea has no reliable delivery system and because there is 
some question as to whether either of its nuclear tests were fully successful, further testing 
could change that. 
The Stockpile Stewardship Program 
In 2002, a U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel determined that U.S. warheads 
could remain safe and reliable without testing if the United States could meet certain 
conditions, among them maintaining a high-quality workforce, using the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program (SSP) to examine weapons components, and refurbishing old 
weapons by remanufacturing them to original specifications.3 
The NAS panel repeatedly asked weapon designers during classified briefings on the 
enduring stockpile whether testing was needed to resolve problems encountered or likely 
to be encountered with the arsenal and the scientists, and engineers always responded 
4that testing was not necessary. (The most likely potential source of nuclear-related 
degradation is the possibility that the primary yield falls below the minimum level needed 
to ignite the secondary. The National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] has 
concluded that plutonium pits have a minimum lifetime of 4560 years [now 100 years] 
with ‘‘no life-limiting factors as yet recognized.’’) The NAS panel concluded: 
Although a properly focused SSP is capable, in our judgment, of maintaining the required 
confidence in the enduring stockpile under a CTBT, we do not believe that it will lead to a 
capability to certify new nuclear subsystem designs for entry in the stockpile without 
nuclear testing*unless by accepting a substantial reduction in the confidence in 
weapon performance associated with the certification up until now, or a return to earlier, 
simpler, single stage design concepts such as gun-type weapons. . . .  
 It seems to us that the argument to the contrary*that is, the argument that 
improvements in the capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence of nuclear 
testing will inevitably lose the race with the growing needs from an aging stockpile* 
underestimates the current capability for stockpile stewardship, underestimates the 
effects of current and likely future rates of progress in improving these capabilities, and 
overestimates the role that nuclear testing ever played (or would be ever likely to play) in 
ensuring stockpile reliability.5 
In light of the fact that the United States has not needed to test in the last seventeen 
years (since the moratorium began), the panel’s conclusions make sense. As I have 
summarized previously, ‘‘Each year the U.S. government has stated that it is ‘confident that 
the stockpile is safe and reliable, and there is no requirement at this time for nuclear 
tests.’6 The annual certification on stockpile readiness requires the secretary of defense 
(after advice from Strategic Command and the military services) and the secretary of 
energy (after advice from the three weapons laboratory directors and the NNSA 
administrator) to determine whether all safety and reliability requirements are being 
met without the need for nuclear testing. These reports have always certified that the 
stockpile does not need testing for reasons of safety or reliability.’’7 The NAS panel also 
concluded that testing is not necessary, provided that the United States maintains a robust 
SSP, there are no new weapon designs, and the United States reserves the right to 
withdraw from the CTBT if it determines nuclear testing is in its national security interest. 
The enduring U.S. stockpile is projected to consist of more than 5,000 warheads 
(about 50 percent operational and 50 percent in reserve) with seven different types (two 
gravity bombs, two ICBM warheads, two SLBM warheads, and one cruise missile 
warhead).8 Collectively, these warheads have been tested some 150200 times.9 There 
has been considerable progress in the SSP, including the following: 
. The Life Extension Programs for the W76 and W87 warheads have been successful; 
. Los Alamos National Laboratory reestablished its ability to fabricate new pits (for the 
W88 warhead). 
. The NNSA (reviewed by the JASONs) determined that plutonium pits will not have 
aging effects for at least 85 to 100 years. 
. Aging problems with non-nuclear components can be tested; in the past, warheads 
were rarely tested for reliability. 
. A more robust tritium transfer system has been devised. 
. The margins-to-uncertainties ratio has improved as margins have been increased and 
uncertainties reduced. 
. Progress has been made in three-dimensional calculations, using the Dual Axis 
Radiographic Hydro-Test Facility at Los Alamos and the National Ignition Facility at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
Owing to conservative planning criteria, the yield delivered to any given target is 
usually much larger than what is actually needed to destroy it, so the only primary issues 
are: does the weapon explode, and is the delivery system sufficiently accurate? Since there 
are seven warhead types in the enduring stockpile, a failure of one type would shift 
responsibility to some of the other six types. NNSA does not consider the criteria for 
nuclear missions in any depth, since targeting is left to the Strategic Command (and, in any 
case, delivery system accuracy does not require nuclear testing). 
There are some common misunderstandings when it comes to assessing warhead 
reliability. The United States has not conducted enough full-scale tests on each warhead 
type to determine reliability with high statistical confidence, and it has certainly not 
accounted for the effects of aging. If we assume ten reliability tests were performed 
on each warhead and all ten were successful, the reliability is not 100 percent with 
100 percent confidence. Instead there is a 30 percent chance that reliability is less than 
90 percent and a 10 percent chance that reliability is less than 80 percent.10 Thus, even 
when the United States was testing weapons dozens of times each year (or more), it has 
never known warhead reliability with precision at the time the warhead entered the 
stockpile, nor has it searched sufficiently for aging effects with confidence tests. In other 
words, when a few successful tests give the design yield, the reliability of a warhead type is 
defined as 1.0, but without a confidence level. If problems arise, the reliability is reduced 
somewhat arbitrarily. 
Because nuclear weapons have on the whole proven extremely reliable, the 
Department of Energy (DOE) historically only conducted about one test per year to 
examine the reliability of all the deployed warhead types. Contrary to popular belief, 
nuclear testing has not played a large role in determining the reliability of nuclear 
weapons. Rather, non-explosive monitoring and testing has played the dominant role in 
assessing the confidence in the reliability of nuclear weapons. 
The NNSA had a fiscal 2008 budget of $6.6 billion for weapons activities, including 
the SSP, which is significantly greater than the Cold War budgets (in inflation-adjusted 
dollars). Testing data obtained from DOE with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
is discussed below.11 These and other data suggest that primary/secondary stages do not 
show significant aging problems once they have been in the field for a few years. The 
average age of discovery for warhead retrofits was 1.8 years after the first production unit. 
Sidney Drell and Robert Peurifoy discussed the technical issues involved with a nuclear test 
ban.12 They quantified warhead reliability as follows: ‘‘Since the start of the current 
stockpile evaluation and reliability assessment program in 1958, about 13,000 weapon 
evaluations have been conducted. During this period, the failure rate of the non-device 
hardware suggests an expected weapon failure rate of 12% for the stockpile.’’ 
When is Testing Required? 
To mitigate the effect of potential nuclear bomber-related accidents, the B61 gravity bomb 
was reconfigured to use insensitive high explosives. In addition, the W80 was modified to 
handle the extremely cold temperatures encountered during flight. The NAS panel stated: 
The question of whether nuclear testing might ever be needed to correct problems 
discovered in weapons certification and deployment generated some controversy in the 
1980s. However it was shown that almost all of the problems cited in support of this 
proposition were either of a kind not requiring nuclear testing or represented cases 
where testing had been inadequate during development. In relating these experiences to 
the current situation it is also important to note that the observed failures all occurred 
within three years after entry into the stockpile. The weapons in today’s active stockpile 
have long passed the age where anomalies in initial production units are a significant 
problem. Furthermore, they are all based on tested designs that have taken advantage of 
lessons learned from older vintages.13 
Non-nuclear components, which can be examined, tested, and replaced without the 
need for detonating a warhead, represent the main threat to warhead reliability. Some of 
the problem areas that have been identified include: degradation of high explosives, 
insufficient tritium, corrosion of fissile materials, faulty cables, and pilot parachutes.14 
Reliability for Nuclear Weapon Missions 
The NNSA annually certifies the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, without considering 
nuclear targeting or delivery systems. As I explained in an earlier work, ‘‘the ability to destroy 
a target depends on: the hardness (H) of the target (minimum destruction pressure); the 
yield (Y) of the weapon; the accuracy of the weapon (CEP, circular error probable); the 
reliability (R) of the weapon system (01); and the number (n) of warheads attacking a target 
(taking into account fratricide).15 The single-shot-kill-probability (SSKP) is the kill probability 
of a single warhead on a known target with perfect reliability of R1.’’16 For warheads with 
less than perfect reliability, the kill probability of one warhead on a target is P1 SSKP x R. I 
initially assume very lethal warheads with SSKP1, giving a kill probability for one warhead 
of P1 R. ‘‘If n independent warheads from n missiles are used on a target without fratricide 
[when one incoming weapon destroys another], the kill probability is Pn 1  (1  R)
n. 
Reliability of R0.5 gives [P1 0.5,] P2 0.75 and P3 0.88, and R0.25 gives [P1 0.25,] 
P2 0.44 and P3 0.58. Except for the case of a pre-emptive attack against a large force, 
additional warheads on a target can be used’’ when there are uncertainties.17 
What’s important to understand is that even a reduction by a factor of two in the 
yield does not have much of an impact on the desired results of the mission. Consider two 
cases*the W88 warhead of 455 kilotons (kt) and the W76 warhead of 100 kt. In both cases 
we will assume a 100-meter accuracy attacking a 2,000 pounds per square inchhardened 
silo with 0.9 reliability. Table 1 lists the P1, P2, and P3 probabilities for yields of the W88 (455 
kt), the W88-2 (228 kt), the W76 (100 kt), and the W76-2 (50 kt). 
TABLE 1 
Kill probability versus yield. 
455 kt 228 kt 100 kt 50 kt 
P1 0.90 0.88 0.80 0.67 
P2 0.9894 0.9849 0.957 0.888 
P3 0.9983 0.9981 0.991 0.963 
For the case of a 50 percent reduction in the 455 kt yield of the W88 larger weapon, 
there is only a small reduction in the kill probabilities. A reduction to 228 kt reduces P1 by 
2 percent, from 0.90 to 0.88, but P2 drops only 0.5 percent, and P3 drops even less at 0.05 
percent. For the case of a reduction of 50 percent in the 100 kt yield of the W76 small 
weapon, the effect is larger, but certainly manageable. A reduction to 50 kt reduces P1 by 
16 percent, from 0.80 to 0.67, and P2 drops by 7 percent and P3 drops even less at 
3 percent. The 450 ICBM warheads with yields of mostly 335 kt are closer to the case of the 
W88. Thus, major reductions in yield of up to 50 percent do not change the outcomes of 
the strategic weapon attacks. 
Today, there is strong agreement that the main mission of nuclear weapons is to 
deter nuclear attacks by other nations, and that nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists 
who are non-state actors. Ivan Oelrich, acting president of the Federation of American 
Scientists and director of its Strategic Security Program, examined fifteen missions for 
nuclear weapons.18 Fourteen of the missions can be handled with multiple warheads on 
each target. Only the fifteenth mission, a pre-emptive attack on Russia, requires an 
extremely reliable nuclear force structure with many counterforce warheads. 
Nuclear Weapons Safety 
Nearly every publicly acknowledged U.S. strategic nuclear accident has involved aircraft 
(twenty-nine cases out of thirty-two total). Just one U.S. nuclear weapon accident has 
occurred since 1968, when a dropped wrench fell onto a liquid-fueled Titan II ICBM in a silo 
in Arkansas, triggering an explosion that destroyed the silo and the missile but did not 
spread radioactivity. Two aircraft-related accidents (in 1966 and 1968) spread significant 
amounts of radioactivity. However, accidents involving aircraft are no longer relevant, 
since aircraft no longer carry nuclear weapons unless they are placed on a special national 
security alert (or are being transported). 
A 1992 law required the Defense Department to carry out a costbenefit analysis 
(without specifying criteria) on the addition of new safety features that require nuclear 
testing to ensure high reliability. Officials from both the George H.W. Bush administration 
(Robert Barker in 1992) and the Bill Clinton administration (John Deutch and Rear Admiral 
John Mitchell in 1993) testified the enhanced safety measures were not needed because 
the costs were significant and the benefits were minor. There is a consensus that there are 
no significant safety problems requiring modifications that in turn need nuclear testing to 
confirm their status.19 
The Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces 
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, commonly known as the Moscow Treaty) 
allows the United States and Russia 2,200 strategic operational warheads by 2012 with the 
freedom to mix basing modes. The United States reached the 2,200 limit in February 2009. 
The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will lower this number, to perhaps 1,500. 
 
 
The U.S. strategic force is likely to maintain the traditional triad of fourteen Trident 
submarines (twelve operational and two in maintenance), 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, and 
fifty-six B-52 and twenty B-2 heavy bombers. The 2,200 operational warheads will reside on: 
Tridents (1,440), Minutemen III (450), and heavy bombers (some 300).20 The United States 
also maintains 2,500 non-operational warheads with a combination of two Tridents (240) in 
overhaul, tactical bombs on mostly F-15E aircraft (500) and in inactive reserve (790), 
submarine-launched cruise missiles (100) and inactive reserve (200), and air-launched cruise 
missile and bombs (700).21 Thus, the total number of U.S. warheads will be about 5,000. 
Russian strategic forces are projected to have 1,500 operational strategic warheads 
in 2025, assuming that all SS-18s and SS19s have been dismantled.22 Russia currently is 
building ten SS27s (Topol-M) per year, probably with three warheads each. There 
continues to be slow progress in three areas: Borey submarines, Bulava submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and Tu-160 (Blackjack) heavy bombers. It is projected 
that Russia’s strategic forces of 2025 might consist of 1,500 warheads with 400 warheads 
on SS-27 missiles, perhaps 600700 on eight submarines (with difficulty) and 400500 
warheads on 30 Tu-160 heavy bombers.23 This number could be reduced with a new 
strategic arms control treaty. 
Only Russia is capable of launching a significant preemptive attack on U.S. strategic 
forces, but such an attack would be suicidal and unsuccessful. Analysts usually employ 
worst-case analysis, assuming that the attack is effective, without practice on real, multiple 
targets. Russia could easily destroy all U.S. heavy bombers at their three or four bases, as 
they usually are not on alert. A preemptive attack could destroy 3350 percent of SLBMs 
(or 500700 of 1,440 warheads). Russia could destroy, at best, some 80 percent of U.S. 
ICBMs (or 360 of 450 warheads). Table 2 displays, using calculations based on a worst-case 
scenario, a surviving U.S. force of 8001,100 warheads, plus reserves. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) considered the effects from very 
large violations of START I and II.24 A surviving U.S. force of 1,000 warheads would have 
few Russian strategic targets, since Russian launchers would be empty. U.S. forces could be 
supplemented with a responsive/reserve force of up to 1,000 warheads, but with wide 
variations in how quickly such weapons could be made ready. The survivable U.S. force of 
1,000 warheads would not be meaningfully affected by unobserved CTBT testing 
TABLE 2 
U.S. surviving warheads under SORT.
 
A worst-case analysis is used to determine the strength of the U.S. response force.
 
U.S Destroyed U.S. Survived 
300 (all heavy bombers off alert) 0 
500700 (3350 percent of SLBMs) 7001,000 
350 (80 percent of ICBMs) 100 
Total 
1,1501,350 8001,100 � reserves 
Source: David Hafemeister, Physics of Societal Issues (New York: Springer, 2007), Ch. 2. 
  
 
 
violations at very small yields. The SFRC reports considered breakouts of the following 
types: numbers of warheads, mobile missiles and other missiles, modernization, numbers 
of re-entry vehicles on a missile, cheating on downloading, and failure to destroy missiles 
and nuclear weapons. The potential violations to the two START treaties were shown to be 
not militarily significant, since a response force of 1,000 warheads would not be 
jeopardized by massive cheating. In short, the CTBT is effectively verifiable because 
CTBT violations are far less threatening to U.S. strategic forces than potential violations 
under START, which has been shown to be effectively verifiable. 
Net Benefit Analysis and Conclusion 
The NAS panel considered three scenarios*a CTBT (with compliance), no CTBT, and CTBT 
(with evasion) for seven nations (Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran). 
It concluded, ’’The worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to 
US security interestssophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many more 
adversariesthan the worst-case scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within 
the constraints posed by the monitoring system.’’25 
In 2001, General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
delivered a report that examined the net benefit of the CTBT by considering all aspects, 
including the ramifications of a world with and without a CTBT.26 The benefits of U.S. 
ratification of a test ban treaty ‘‘clearly outweighed’’ the risks. The advantages as 
Shalikashvili saw them included: 
. The Test Ban Treaty will complicate and slow down the efforts of aspiring nuclear 
states, especially regarding more advanced types of nuclear weapons. 
. It will hamper the development by Russia and China of nuclear weapons based on 
new designs and will essentially rule out certain advances. 
. It will add to the legal and political constraints that nations must consider when they 
form their judgments about national defense policies. 
. The Test Ban Treaty is vital to the long-term health of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, and will increase support for other elements of a comprehensive non­
proliferation strategy. 
. The United States is well positioned to sustain its nuclear deterrent under the Test Ban 
Treaty. 
. The verification regime established under the Treaty will enhance the United States’ 
own very capable nuclear test monitoring system and foster new techniques to 
improve verification. 
. The Treaty will make it easier to mobilize domestic and international support for 
clarifying ambiguous situations and for responding vigorously if any nation conducts 
a nuclear test. 27 
Though Shalikashvili’s assessment was written nearly a decade ago, his benefit 
analysis has stood the test of time. Ratifying the CTBT and seeing it enter into force remain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strongly in the U.S. national security interest*a conclusion supported by the above 
analysis as well. 
Both the NPT and the CTBT regimes are weakened by a United States that fails to 
ratify the CTBT. Without U.S. ratification of the test ban, China and Russia are more likely to 
return to testing and to modernization that depends on testing, thus reigniting the 
nuclear arms race, and without ratification of the CTBT, the United States also has less 
leverage against the nuclear transition states of Iran, North Korea, India, Israel, and 
Pakistan. The president can withdraw from the CTBT with a pen stroke; if a return to 
testing is required in the future, the United States can do so. There is greater global 
consensus on the positive merits of the CTBT than on any other arms control treaty; the 
time for Washington to act is now. 
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